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This project began due to my philosophical reflections on two texts:  The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory by Pierre Duhem, and From a Logical Point of View by Willard Van Orman Quine, specifically his essay "Two Dogmas of Empiricism".  In one way or another this issue of underdetermination permeates all discussions in Philosophy of Science:  the demarcation between science and pseudoscience, the difference between science and religion, theories as research programs, conjectures and refutations, nomological-deductive view of science, theory of knowledge and so on.

The aim of this project is to discuss at length the most important aspects of underdetermination.  Specifically, I wish to look at it from a non-naturalized, Platonist, and phenomenological point of view.   For this task I want to use Edmund Husserl's philosophy as a point of reference with respect to the relation between formal science and natural science, as well as the explanation of our cognitive processes.


Some people might ask, why did I choose Husserl as a point of reference to discuss some of the most important issues in Philosophy of Science.  The reason is that his phenomenological doctrine has been unfairly despised both in the analytic and continental traditions, and much of his views have been forgotten during these discussions.

For example, Husserl's view of mathematics is the one which resembles closely to its development in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.  Most people forget that Husserl practically foresaw many of the discoveries on how the mind works, because of his phenomenological research.  Also philosophers of science do not know that Husserl's view of natural science was practically the nomological-deductive proposal.

This does not mean that I consider Husserlian philosophy to be perfect.  After all, he did suppose the self-evidence of mathematics' completeness, or that phenomenology can be developed "without prejudices", among other errors.  However, these errors are extremely small compared to the gigantic Husserlian legacy.  The vast majority of all the arguments presented to ignore Husserl are unfounded, due to myths which have been said about him, and misunderstandings of his phenomenological doctrine.

This project will in part vindicate his doctrine and see the usefulness of a non-naturalist and platonist approach to formal science (logic and mathematics) as well as the cognitive processes of the mind.  Only in this way, we will be able to account for all the different levels of underdetermination in the scientific enterprise.



Today most of philosophy in America, including analytic philosophy, has been influenced by Naturalism, specifically because of W. V. O. Quine.  Although Naturalism has generated much interesting debate, it is true that it has not helped philosophers see some problems clearly, or to look for a right solution to problems.  Supposing scientific activity as a foundation for philosophy hinders us from asking some important questions (for instance, what makes a theory scientific or not).  From Quine's rejection of analytic and synthetic distinction, it would be impossible to determine the very important difference between the cognitive processes of sensible experience in the world, and, for instance, mathematical or logical reasoning.  It also does not let us see the clear difference between formal science and natural science, and how both of them proceed.  It does not account at all the grasp of meanings by separate individuals, when all psychological processes are subjective.  These, among many other problems in the logical and epistemological order, do have consequences in Philosophy of Science.

Philosophers of science are generally Platophobic, and usually want to suppose only the natural, empirical or material criterion to develop a sound Philosophy of Science.  As much as they try to do it, in one form of another they fail to account the most important aspects of natural science and its relation to formal science.  They also fail to account the continuous dialogue between Philosophy and Science.

This Project I'm engaged in, will try to correct many of these misconceptions.  It will not pretend at all to have all the answers.  The more we know of the world, the more we know we know nothing (to paraphrase Socrates) or at least we realize how little do we know about these subjects both scientifically and philosophically.  I hope that this Project will be a stepping stone to something bigger and far more fascinating.