This article is part of a series of articles on the subject of evolution, ethics and spirituality:
Parts: I, II, III, IV, V, VI (1), VI (2), VII, VIII (1), VIII (2), IX (1), IX (2), IX (3), X (1), X (2), X (3)
Returning to Popper’s Proposal
If there is a common denominator for memeticists is that they all, in one manner or another, thank Karl Popper for the idea of a Darwinian evolutionary growth. Darwin’s theory of evolution establishes that nature is a "blind watchmaker", as Dawkins would say. Yet, culture seems to be another thing altogether. Memetics doesn’t work, because memes are supposed to operate irrationally (blindly), they jump from human brain to human brain and create the illusion that humans have an ego, that they think, that they reason, etc.
But, did Popper actually propose a Darwinist epistemology? Actually he did not, even thought he actually thought he did. Popper is to be blamed for this confusion. There are three reasons for it:
- The first big problem which confused Popper has to do with the remarkable resemblance between the way organisms speciate, and the way that culture evolves or develops. In both cases, they both look alike. This is the Popperian diagram on how culture develops (left), and Darwin’s own diagram in The Origin of Species, as we have explained in a previous post (Popper, 1994, p. 62).
- This first problem leads to a second problem: the confusion was that he established a strong analogy (there is that problem again!) between the Darwinian way which living beings evolve non-progressively, and the way culture evolves (Popper, 1994, pp. 60-62). Popper is correct when he says Darwin’s proposal excludes the concept of "progress". Since nature is a "blind watchmaker", it is not trying to "perfect" organisms, rather what organisms do is to survive or die depending on their genetic makeup, behavior, and environmental factors. But this is not true about culture. Yes, there are some cultural aspects which are non-progressive, but this is not true in cases such as science, philosophy, theology, or even fields such as art and literature. In fact, Popper recognizes some of this as deviation from Darwinism (Popper, 1994, pp. 63).
- Finally, the third problem: Popper does not establish a clear distinction (although it is confusingly there) among kinds of problems. For instance, he does recognize that at the level of unintelligent organisms, we can talk about "problems" and "solutions" to these "problems". For example, organisms in general have problems regarding survival. Not being able to survive is a "problem", which gene-mutation and natural selection "solve" by predisposing the organism’s brain or its structure to overcome the "problem". Yet, these "problems" are unlike those like these: how many angels can dance on the head of a pin, or the problem of how Mercury does not behave according to Newtonian theory, i.e. problems with no survival value.
This problem is aggravated by the fact that even when Popper recognizes a teleology in culture, both unintelligent and intelligent organisms create an abstract World 3 (see previous post on these details).
If all of this is problematic for Popper, it is because of one thing. As we have seen in our previous post on memetics, culture is not Darwinian. And by establishing important exceptions to a Darwinian view, Popper is actually denying that culture is Darwinian without realizing it. However "alike" are the process of speciation among living beings, and cultural evolution, in reality culture is Lamarckian. Why? Here is the difference between Darwinian and Lamarckian. "Lamarckian" means that whatever the process is occurring, it has a purpose, a goal. "Darwinian" means the most quoted passage ever from Richard Dawkins:
The universe we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but blind, pitiless indifference (Dawkins, 1995, p. 133).
Of course, after those depressing words, there is a downer within us, but Dawkins has a point. Darwinism is an amoral process. We should not be surprised that we find instances of disgust when we look at nature and are puzzled at how much struggle and suffering can be engines for life and evolution. This is one of the reasons why Darwin could not conceive a Creator Who could be so cruel as to create a ichneumon wasp that would paralyze (but not kill) caterpillars, so that it could lay its eggs within them for its larvae to eat them alive.
Yet, there are many cultural aspects which are concerned with many rational and intelligent aspects of the problem-solving process: design of the economy to make it more effective, the best possible political process, concern with ethical acts, and so on. Nature may not be intelligently designed, but culture is.
This means that we have to understand the realm of culture in very different terms. Here is my suggestion, not exempt from problems, but I think it is the best philosophical direction to this discussion I can think of:
- Let’s establish a difference between improper problems and proper problems. Improper problems are those which occur unintelligently in nature as "problem for survival" (be them genetic, environmental, or dealing with sexual appeal). Proper problems are those arising from culture, they are intelligently grasped, understood, and recognized, hence requiring intelligent solutions. Improper problems are Darwinian, while proper problems are Lamarckian.
- Let’s assume, for our discussion Popper’s problem-solving scheme for culture, and avoid the misnomer "Darwinian".
From this perspective, I think that we can properly address the way we have culturally organized society.
Our Ethical Framework
We have already stated that the way organisms develop, and how Darwinian evolution works is essentially amoral. However, we, humans, are moral animals. Theologian John Haught, frequantly points out the difficulty of how amoral processes can give rise to moral beings. Yet, what do we mean by "moral beings" or by the term "amoral"? This needs to be clarified.
- Amoral: a being or a process whose way of being or its operations are not concerned at all with the ethical values of "right", "wrong", "good", "bad", or "evil". The concepts of "virtue"and "vice" in an amoral being and in amoral operations are not determined at all by ethical values either.
- Moral Being: a being whose way of behavior is determined by the values of "right", "wrong", "good", "bad", or "evil". The concepts of "virtue" and "vice" are determined by these values.
This is the consequence of being a rational animal, and also a result of the very complex way our brain is designed. When we discussed the way our brain developed as a result of the Darwinian process of exaptation, the article gives us a gist of how we became moral animals:
- The R-Complex is where all our basic and fundamental instincts reside. Without them, we wouldn’t have stimuli which are essential to every decision making.
- The limbic system is where primary emotions come in. As many labs and studies have shown extensively it is impossible to make rational decisions without emotions. The reason is that the limbic system gives the emotional twist to the instincts provided by the R-Complex, and it provides us with the faculty of empathy. Empathy lets us place ourselves in someone else’s shoes from an emotional standpoint. People without empathy are unable to have feelings of guilt or regret, which are psychologically necessary to develop a good and healthy moral sense.
- The neocortex lets us calculate, reason, and rationalize our behavior. It also processes higher level emotional processes. This helps us in the decision making, itself made possible by …
- The executive part of the brain, or the frontal lobes. This is the part of the brain where our consciousness (our "self" or our "ego") in the intuitive resides, where we make our decisions, where we actually project the consequences of our actions.
I’ve discussed this in more detail in another blog post in this series.
Without these parts of our brain originated through exaptation, we wouldn’t be able to be moral animals. We must not overestimate ourselves, though. We are not the only moral beings on Earth. Many other primates do share a lesser degree of moral sense: they can be predisposed biologically to be upset when they are lied to, or when there is adultery, or when a member of the group steals. There is a sense of "right" and "wrong" in them.
Of course, multilevel-group selection proposed by David Sloan Wilson and others can explain this perfectly: anything that erodes the trust of the group is rejected by that group. Also, moral behavior, especially with kin organisms within a group, is part of the whole system of solidarity and cooperation that makes a species survive.
For more information on this interesting subject go to http://evolutionofmorality.net.
Now, I have mentioned this notion of moral sense, a term used by David Hume and other philosophers to refer to that feeling or intuition of what is "right" or "wrong". If other animals have moral sense, it would seem that humans are not unique in that sense either. Some people have stated that it is no longer plausible to establish a significant difference between humans and the rest of the animals in terms of reason and morality.
Yet, I beg to differ. The rest of the animals, even those acting with moral sense, are unable to rationally reflect on what they are doing. In humans we find the fact that our brain has a recursive quality: not only am I thinking, but I am also aware that I am thinking, and that I am aware that I am aware that I’m thinking. As Descartes would say: even if I denied that I’m thinking, I’m still thinking. The cogito (our thinking activity) is an essential part of human consciousness.
Due to this self-reflection, we are able to know that even our moral sense can be wrong from time to time. This is one of the great puzzles for those who wish to naturalize ethics. Dawkins said that sometimes we should go against our "selfish-genes" to do what is "right". Yet, he is unable to answer in purely naturalistic terms how do we know what is "right" and when to oppose our selfish genes. If we go to the multilevel group understanding of selection, not always the solidarity system established by organism can be said to be "right" regarding such and such individual. A behavior which alienates a member which a group considers the "odd" one can be beneficial in the amoral evolutionary process, but it is not said to be objectively good. Also, different forms of alienation within the groups (e.g. alienating either males or females, or the weak, or the less able) can be advantageous from an evolutionary standpoint, and yet it is not good from an ethical one.
Hence, we should distinguish between the moral and the ethical. An act is moral if it follows the uses and customs of a society. This might include uses and customs depending on biological dispositions, or adopted culturally by human society. An act is ethical, if it is inherently good. The field of ethics is precisely the one which investigates what is rationally which actions can be called good. This field is subdivided in three:
- Metaethics: Imagine that some extraterrestrials from planet Melmac, the world of ALF (aka Gordon Shumway), sends a spaceship full of scientists and intellectuals … if that is possible in Melmac
… to study and evaluate human behavior. Indeed they would use some rational principles to evaluate those behaviors (supposing that Melmacians are rational). These principles are the concern of metaethics. This is the field that investigates the rational principles which let us evaluate moral norms as being ethical or not.
- Normative Ethics: This is the field which investigates ethical norms themselves, which should derive from principles investigated by metaethics.
- Applied Ethics: Given that our experiences in the world does not lead us to "black or white" clear-cut decisions, applied ethics deals with the problem of prioritizing ethical norms in every day life. This can go from bioethics, to environmental ethics, to law, business, etc. Practically most ethicists are dedicated to this field.
There are also two different approaches to the subject of ethical behavior. One is called teleological ethics, that is, the ethical view that we should take a course of action due to the consequences in the long run. It is teleological because it has a goal external to our actions. Utilitarianism which is so praised in the Anglo-Saxon world is a form of teleological ethics.
The other approach is called deontological ethics, which is the ethical view that we should follow ethical norms because they themselves are good, they themselves are our only goal regardless of their consequences.
Each of these views has advantages and disadvantages. My approach from here on will be a deontological, that ethical norms should be followed because they good-in-themselves. This will give us the appropriate framework to discuss ethics within the complexities we find in every day life.
P.S. That you do not know about Planet Melmac???? That you have no idea who Gordon Shumway is (aka ALF)??!!! Here I post two videos to refresh your memory!
References
Dawkins, R. River out of Eden: a Darwinian view of life. US: Basic Books.
O’Hear, A. (1980). Karl Popper. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Popper, K. R. (1972). Objective knowledge: an evolutionary approach. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Popper, K. R. (1994). Knowledge and the body-mind problem: in defence of interaction. London: Routledge.
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This article is part of a series of articles on the subject of evolution, ethics and spirituality:
Parts: I, II, III, IV, V, VI (1), VI (2), VII, VIII (1), VIII (2), IX (1), IX (2), IX (3), X (1), X (2)
Universal Darwinism
One can certainly understand the great philosopher Daniel Dennett when he says:
If I were to give an award for the single best idea anyone has ever had, I’d give it to Darwin, ahead of Newton and Einstein and everyone else. In a single stroke, the idea of evolution by natural selection unifies the realm of life, meaning, and purpose with the realm of space and time, cause and effect, mechanism and physical law. (Dennett, 1995, p. 21).
I would certainly extend that prize to Alfred Russel Wallace too, after all, both were simultaneous discoverers of natural selection, even though Wallace considered evolution through natural selection Darwinian, as he eloquently put it in the title of one of his books, Darwinism (1889).
I share that enthusiasm. As a matter of fact, behind my car I have an Icthus with the name "Jesus", and a modified Icthus with the name "Darwin". Of course, I’m thankful that I live in Puerto Rico in an academic environment, not in the south of the U.S., from where Reverend Michael Dowd reports there were some interesting gestures made by people when they saw something similar on the side of the van.
Yet, how far should this enthusiasm go? The three big proponents of the "meme" view of culture happen to subscribe to something called Universal Darwinism. Susan Blackmore (1999) defines it this way:
the application of Darwinian thinking way beyond the confines of biological evolution (p. 5).
The American philosopher Daniel Dennett (1995) has described the whole evolutionary process as an algorithm, that is, a mindless procedure which, when followed, must produce an outcome. . . . [Darwin's] logic would apply equally to any system in which there was heredity, variation, and selection. This, again, is the idea of Universal Darwinism. (p. 10).
That is what Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, and Susan Blackmore are trying to do with the concept of memes. As explained in the previous post, this seems all nice and dandy, but there are some problems.
The Problem with Selfish Genes and Selfish Memes
David Sloan Wilson is less known by the public, but he is a great authority on the theory of evolution. Like Dawkins, Dennett, and Blackmore, he believes that religion is the result of evolutionary processes. Unlike them, though, he believes that religions evolved for useful purposes and are still useful, regardless of whether they are true or not. For this reason, he is managing the Evolutionary Religious Studies. But, more to the point, he and the famous Edward O. Wilson (another famous evolutionist) support a Neo-Darwinian view of things that is not at all like what Dawkins and company have in mind.
For Dawkins, and for some other scientists, the selection happens primarily at the genetic level. Genes are the ones which are competing with one another in the struggle for life, they want to "survive" using us as their means of reproduction and survival. This is his selfish-gene metaphor formulated for the first time by Richard Dawkins in 1976. David Sloan Wilson, on the other hand, believes that selection happens in groups, in fact, many group levels. This is the multilevel group selection. He explains his theory in these blog posts (I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XIV(2), XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX). His fights with Dawkins in this area are well known (as it is illustrated by his "Open Letter to Richard Dawkins").
Basically, the "selfish-gene" skeptics simply cannot accept, as Dawkins does, that the struggle for life can be reduced to genes. We should see, instead, the more complicated ways of surviving which organisms have developed. First, natural selection operates at an organic level, the individual organism as a whole. Second, not even that individual is alone, but forms part of a group or a species. Its selection depends greatly on the group, and how this group of organisms interact with other groups of organisms at many levels. One of the most important mechanisms of group survival is its sexual activity and reproduction success. Other mechanisms seem to include altruistic behavior to guarantee the common good, which maximizes a species’ success. In a future blog post I shall argue that this is not altruism properly speaking, but solidarity (i.e. a social behavior where something is given in exchange for something else). This scheme of solidarity might include selfless acts within the group, but in the end it is for everyone’s benefit.
Why is this important? Mainly because it demystifies a lot of the "selfish-gene" metaphor within science, and, by extension the "selfish-meme" metaphor. As some experiments seem to suggest, there is empirical evidence that the multilevel group selection seems to be a better model with which to understand group behavior. Wilson wants to extend this view to a cultural level. Just as he rejects "selfish-genes", it can be said that he rejects "selfish-memes" (and I am afraid that he doesn’t believe in memes all that much after all). The reason why he studies religion so extensively is to show that, contrary to what Dawkins is arguing, it is far from being a "virus of the mind". Religion is useful to help us succeed as a species. Again, the issue of truth is not in question at this level, only the aspect of the role it plays in society, its ability to group people and establish a solidarity (or in his words "altruistic" behavior) for everyone’s benefit within that group. Wilson has argued this very good point in his book Darwin’s Cathedral.
When Memes are Scientifically Useless
Of course, regarding memes themselves, we should ask two very important questions:
- Are memes subject to empirical inquiry?
- Is the concept of memes useful for various scientific disciplines?
Let’s explore the first. It is very difficult (almost impossible) to establish memes as subject of empirical inquiry. Memes are entities that inhabit their creators’ minds. They are culturally shared, which means that they jump from mind to mind, replicating in a Neo-Darwinian manner. Since it is a cultural replicator, a meme is itself invisible. Therefore, it is in principle not observable.
This does not mean that all unobservable things are untrue. We cannot observe the center of the black hole, but we can infer it from the theories we have available regarding their existence in space-time along with several observations in the universe that seem to indicate that black holes exist. Theories on black holes predict the outcome of certain effects, which can be correlated with several phenomena we have seen out there. We can infer a cause by its effect, as long as we have a theory to interpret those "effects". Some scientists want to approach to memes this way. They predict that memes can activate several parts of our brains, and the same meme will activate that same part of the brain. That will prove to be difficult, because one sole part of the brain may be activated by a barrage of causes, which is the reason why neuroscience is still a very difficult subject, and the brain the most mysterious composite organ in nature.
But what makes this a bit more difficult is that memes, as portrayed by Dawkins, is strongly analogous to a gene. However, a gene can be observed, detected, and even isolated. There are many cases where we don’t know exactly where that unit ends or begins, but it’s there! Yet, as Susan Blackmore (1999) herself seems to recognize, a meme is not a unit as a gene is (pp. 53-57), she even says that there is no right answer for what a meme unit is (p. 54), and even with that, Blackmore says that this limitation itself is not a problem! (p. 53) This is so true, that even Richard Dawkins states in the foreword to Blackmore’s book (Blackmore, 1999):
Another objection is that we don’t know what memes are made of, or where they reside. Memes have not yet found their Watson and Crick; they even lack their Mendel. Whereas genes are to be found in precise locations on chromosomes, memes presumably exist in brains, and we have even less chance of seeing one than seeing a gene (through the neurobiologist Juan Delius has pictured his conjecture of what a meme might look like) (p. xii).
Apparently, Blackmore does not consider as problems the fact that we don’t even know which are the mechanisms for "copying and storing" memes (supposedly both happen in our brains) (pp. 56-58).
The fundamental problem with memes was pointed out by chemist and theologian, Alister McGrath (aka "Dawkins’ famous foe"): the concept of memes relies heavily in an analogy. As he rightfully points out, analogies can be helpful, but if you rely too much on them, they become a problem. Dawkins should be familiar with such problems, since he has had to explain the metaphor of the selfish-gene for the nth time to many people who don’t seem to understand it (McGrath, 2007, pp. 131-133). As McGrath correctly points out:
All human cultures possess a means by which information may be transmitted within existing populations and to subsequent generations — such as books, rituals, institutions, and oral traditions. The notion of a "meme" is functionally redundant, forcing its defenders to make a case by analogy with the gene — yet to downplay the empirically determined biological, chemical, and physical parameters of the gene, which are now an essential aspect of molecular genetics. The plausibility of the meme is thus grounded in a questionable analogical argument, not in overwhelming evidence and observation (McGrath, 2007, p. 133).
What about its use? Is it useful in any scientific field? Not yet! To say that aspects of culture or memes replicate is to state a truism about culture in Neo-Darwinian language. Beyond that, memetics has not helped understand any better the following fields: neurology, sociobiology, cognitive science, anthropology, religious studies, history, politics, economics, literature, psychology, and so on. Anthropology has better explanatory models to explain social behavior, and cognitive science has greatly contributed to understanding culture, as Steven Pinker has shown in his masterpiece The Blank Slate. Yet, it is not obvious at all how memetics contributes to understanding anything.
Even with McGrath’s admiration for books such as The Selfish Gene, and how ingenious Dawkins’ idea of the "meme" is, he (and his wife) cannot help but to point out what is pseudo-scientific about memetics:
The issue … is whether the meme can be considered to be a viable scientific hypothesis when there is no clear operational definition of a meme, no testable model for how memes influence culture and why standard selection models are not adequate, a general tendency to ignore the sophisticated social science models of information transfer already in place, and a high degree of circularity in the explanation of the power of memes (McGrath & McGrath, 2007, pp. 71-72).
In Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (Dennett, 1995), Dennett advocates for the use of the concept of "meme" for science, he explores the similarities and differences between genes and memes (pp. 352-360). However, he still cannot establish its scientificity.
Memes Jumping Around All Over the Place! No Reason for It, and No Reason Along with It
There is a question on whether memes are Darwinian or Lamarckian. As we all know, Jean-Baptiste Lamarck formulated a theory of evolution, long before Darwin, which established the idea that animals evolved to enhance themselves for survival. For instance, an ancient giraffe would have had a very short neck, but its neck "stretched" throughout an evolutionary process to reach the leaves at the top of the trees. Darwin, on the other hand, proposed that natural selection is the one that made this "stretch" possible. This is a blind process where those giraffes with longer necks did survive better and reproduce more than those with short necks (they died out). Are memes Lamarckian or Darwinian. Blackmore, once again, seems to favor a Darwinian view of memes, even though she recognizes that as it is right now, perhaps this issue is undecided. And once again, she says that this is not a problem for memetics at all! (Blackmore, 1999, pp. 59-62) ~ Shaking my head ~
It seems that Dennett (1995) also favors the view that memes are Darwinian. Of course, this has its consequences regarding why I believe that, contrary to what he states in his book (pp. 361-369), memes are not philosophically important. The main objection to Dennett’s line of reasoning was voiced by Anthony O’Hear, a philosopher I have really big disagreements with, but not regarding this specific subject. His worry is Dennett’s line about his denial about the existence of a "reflective mind", instead he formulates the idea of a meme-created mind (O’Hear, 1997, p. 157). In Dennett’s own words:
… if it is true that human minds are themselves to a very great degree the creations of memes, then we cannot sustain the polarity vision we considered earlier; it cannot be "memes versus us," because earlier infestations of memes have already played a major role in determining who or what are we. The "independent" mind struggling to protect itself from alien and dangerous memes is a myth (Dennett, 1995, p. 365).
O’Hear points out that for Dennett, even the ordinary concept of consciousness is a myth. He also criticizes Dennett for establishing the power-relationship of memes (i.e. if we criticize some beliefs on the stance of others, then that happens because some memes are more powerful than others in our minds) (O’Hear, 1997, p. 157).
I have no problem with the idea that the interaction of mental modules can originate the "self" (i.e. consciousness as we intuitively know it). This has been worked out by Ramachandran’s own theory of the brain (or the mind), and Steven Pinker’s view on the mind as he expressed it in How the Mind Works. These two theories have aspects that are incompatible with each other, but for the sake of the argument, it can go either way. Also, I can fully accept that Pinker’s and Michael Gazzaniga’s view that only in society we can establish a mental notion of "self". It is another thing altogether to claim that the concept of self comes from memes. If anything cognitive scientists have shown (along with anthropology) is that much of our process of conceptuation can be social, but it is also biological in origin. Blackmore does not seem to think that this is a problem, but it is. The fact that there are human universals, that our brains have naturally developed concepts (such as the concept of tools), our ability to see color, etc., means that these are not of memetic origins (memes that suddenly jumped in our heads). These are cultural aspects of human society that seem to be biological in origin, and brought forth through human interaction. Ramachandran explores all of this in his books, as we have explained in our earlier blog posts.
Perhaps more serious regarding this view of memes is that it denies humans’ rational agency, even our ability to make ethical decisions. If we are governed by memes, all important ethical concepts are not there because they are necessary to make good decisions regarding ourselves and society, but because they are "memes trying to survive in our brain … and we cannot escape them". Even the notion that we can make decisions is itself a meme. This would represent a challenge to Dawkins, Dennett and Blackmore, who are in the "New Atheism" arena: Isn’t agnosticism and atheism memes themselves? Why should these positions have more value than religious memes? Isn’t this just a battle about memes which use us as their carriers? What would be the value of being an agnostic or atheist anyway in this case?
When talking about the "selfish-gene" we know that at least genes exist, and that the "selfish" part is just a metaphor. Memes seem to be unreal, they are at best an analogy, the term "selfish" is metaphoric. Wouldn’t that make the term "selfish-meme" a second degree literary device? I’m sure it’s not science!
It’s such a paradox that eminent advocates of rationality today, when pushed logically regarding memetics, deny reason in the end.
Religion: A Virus of the Mind?
Now, I fail to see the relevance of memes altogether if it is not to criticize religion. The term "virus of the mind" was invented for this sole purpose. Religion, for them, is intrinsically bad. It can lead to some good, but as Dawkins clearly states in The God Delusion, it is in average destructive to humanity. Yet, this presents us another very big problem with memes and a subset of these as "viruses of the mind". This was eloquently put by Alister McGrath in a conference for Christians in Science, a group of Christian scientists in the U.K.: "Are all memes viruses of the mind or just those that Dawkins doesn’t like?" This is a very serious question, because it uncovers the deep problems on how ever one determines that memes are viruses or not. This is not clear at all in memetics. This is so not clear, that one of the vocal proponents of the "virus of the mind" thesis, Susan Blackmore, recently retracted from this view.
On the other hand, with his book Breaking the Spell, Dennett tries to be in a way friendly to religion, in the sense of actually exploring it, trying to understand it. However, he still advocates "memes" to explain why humans meet in the Vatican or the Ganges river: it is like an ant’s brain when infected by organisms which make it behave in weird ways to commit suicide. He sums up his statement in this video.
Yet, this view of religion disregards the fact that sometimes radicalism in religious groups happen when the material conditions of the places these prosper are often poor, or submerged in conflict. Usually the enhancement of human life quality can make religion (and other cultural manifestations) less radical and much less harmful. I do agree with Dennett, though, that children should know about other religions and the factual truths about them. However, the proposal is far from having problems, but that is another subject for another time.
So, the question is: Is the term "virus of the mind" scientifically valid? Absolutely not.
Conclusion: "Temes"??? Not Again!!!
Did you think that these criticisms which show that memetics is pseudo-science would stop their proponents from presenting them as scientific ideas? Nope. In fact, as I loved the Evolution PBS TV series, I hated the part that had to do with memes, as if memetics were a scientific discipline.
The enthusiasm has not gone away either. Susan Blackmore is so excited with genes and memes, that she found other entities which use us to preserve themselves. She calls them "temes" ("te" for "technology").
Of course, after I saw this video, I rolled my eyes. That’s all I’m going to say about that. I love Susan Blackmore, but please … !
References
Blackmore, S. (2000). The meme machine. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Burne, D. (2002). Evolución: una guía básica sobre cómo se adaptan y subsisten los seres vivos. México: Editorial Planeta.
Dawkins, R. (2006). The God delusion. US: Bantam.
Dawkins, R. (2008). The extended phenotype: the long reach of the gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Originally published in 1982).
Dawkins, R. (2009). The selfish gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Originally published in 1976).
Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness explained. NY: Back Bay Books.
Dennett, D. C. (1995). Darwin’s dangerous idea: evolution and the meanings of life. NY: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks.
Dennett, D. C. (2006). Breaking the spell: religion as a natural phenomenon. US: Viking.
McGrath, A. (2007). Dawkins’ God: genes, memes, and the meaning of life. US: Blackwell.
McGrath, A. & McGrath, J. C. (2007). The Dawkins’ delusion? Atheist fundamentalism and the denial of the divine. IL: IVP Books.
O’Hear, A. (1997). Beyond evolution: human nature and the limits of evolutionary explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wilson, D. S. (2002). Darwin’s cathedral: evolution, religion, and the nature of society. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
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The Selfish Gene
Today there is one brilliant mind preaching the Gospel … an atheist Gospel. Famous for his book The God Delusion, Richard Dawkins is perhaps one of the most visible representatives of the so-called "New Atheism". Dawkins himself does consider himself atheist, not New Atheist. Some Christians have called him one of the four horsemen of the Apocalypse (the other three being Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris, and Christopher Hitchens). He helped establish an organization for reason and science, which essentially is an atheist movement.
Yet, despite my obvious difference with his position, I do consider him one of the most brilliant minds of this century, and the most lucid writer on Neo-Darwinism you can ever find today. I share V. S. Ramachandran’s position that Dawkins is Darwin’s worthy successor. With the exception of The God Delusion, I love all the rest of his works, which reflect his amazing brilliance and his ability to explain the complexities of evolution in the simplest ways to the public. If you read his most recent book The Greatest Show on Earth, there is no more beautiful analogy to describe how the embryo develops than his analogy of the origami. He also happens to know programming, and he developed a program which mimics how natural selection operates in living beings. The name of the program is called The Blind Watchmaker, which happens to be the name of the book where he talked about it.
But those are not the analogies he is most famous for. His more renowned analogy is that of the "selfish gene". Today we know that Darwin was flat-out wrong regarding his description of how organisms mutate. He did not pay attention to Mendel at the time. Neo-Darwinism integrates genetics in order to describe how these mutations take place, and thanks to Genetics, our understanding of evolution has advanced considerably.
As a result, then, when we talk about "natural selection" what are we really talking about? Are we talking about the selection of phenotypic trait which let them organisms survive? Dawkins answer is no. He is right. In reality, phenotypes are the result of genes in the DNA code. So, what is being selected is a set of genes, not phenotypes.
Dawkins goes beyond that. He uses a metaphor in order to understand how this selection takes place. If what is being selected is a gene, we are talking about a gene that wants to "survive", to preserve itself. We are not talking here about organisms which are under the norm of survival of the fittest, but instead it is a competition among genes. It’s not that we, organisms that try the very best to survive, are actually being privileged with being selected, we are just carriers of the genes which are using us to survive. Genes are the ones which survive, we are just here for the ride.
It is because of selfish genes that we develop ways to survive. That does not mean, though, that these mechanisms have to be purely selfish. The selfish genes in our cells can also encourage altruism in order to preserve our own species. Darwin never understood why there were organisms like ants which were altruistic in nature. Later, the concept of "kin selection" was used to understand this evolutionary dynamic. Kin selection guarantees the survival of a species. Within the "selfish gene" metaphor, it is understood as a means of the selfish gene in order to preserve itself. Interesting! We became moral animals in part because our genes decided to behave selfishly! What do you know!
From Genes to Memes …
There is one very important quality of genes, they are all physical replicators. DNA (along with all of its genes) replicate with mitosis and meiosis. We are the mechanisms that guarantee that the genetic legacy will live on!
Yet, there is another kind of replicator … not physical, but cultural. In The Selfish Gene, Dawkins suggested that we could understand culture as made up of units which he called "meme", which is the short of "mimeme", a word that comes from "mimesis" (imitation). In The Extended Phenotype, he makes several corrections regarding his views of the "meme", concept which was not explained altogether coherently in The Selfish Gene.
For Dawkins, a meme is analogous to a gene. A gene is never to be confused with a phenotype. Genes make phenotypes possible, sometimes they make a whole set of phenotypes possible. Genes are the replicators, the units that reproduce in the cell. In the same way, a meme is a cultural replicator, which generate all the cultural traits analogous to phenotypical traits in an organism. The latter is what Dawkins calls "meme products". Memes are ideas in the brain. Meme products are more the manifestations of those ideas in books, cathedrals, paintings, and music. Ironically, the version of memes which became very, very popular was the one expressed in The Selfish Gene where meme products were considered memes themselves. Curious!
Dawkins also predicted that we could actually see the effects of memes in our brains. They must manifest as certain neural patterns. This itself suggests that memes can be measured and studied, it can be the object of science itself.
Still, as you might expect, just as we talk about the selfish gene, we can also talk about the selfish meme. Metaphorically speaking (of course) memes also use us as carriers to replicate themselves. We are here just for the ride! We are essentially meme machines.
Virus of the Mind
However, the most controversial proposal Dawkins has ever made is that there are "viruses of the mind", religion being one of them. Think about it! A virus is essentially a piece of genetic code covered with a protein coat that reproduces itself introducing itself in the cell. Religion is one such virus of the mind, a meme, which spreads from person to person, to entire communities. They are "mind parasites". Sometimes one virus is not the only one that attacks, but a whole set of them, a gang. Take Roman Catholicism, for instance, it is a whole package of the viruses of the immaculate conception, transubstantiation, the Holy Trinity, you name it! They pass on from parent to child, from the child to his or her friends, from people to people. It is essentially epidemic, leading everyone to believe something that is really not there, something that cannot be tested empirically. A person with this sort of virus of religion is denominated "faith sufferer", and there is a need to vaccinate the minds of youngsters against religion.
This is All Good, But …
Many people, especially from the so-called "New-Atheist" sector, praise the concept of memes. Daniel Dennett uses it philosophically in much of his works, particularly Consciousness Explained, Breaking the Spell, and in his wonderful work Darwin’s Dangerous Idea. Susan Blackmore created the field called "memetics", the study of memes, in order to explain human cultural behavior. Both of these authors share the idea that memes have scientific or philosophical validity, and that to some extent should be considered a science.
Yet, as I favor a Darwinian epistemology and cultural development, I cannot shake the sensation that there is something wrong with Memetics.
(To be continued)
References
Blackmore, S. (2000). The meme machine. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dawkins, R. (2003). A Devil’s chaplain: selected essays. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Dawkins, R. (2006). The God delusion. US: Bantam.
Dawkins, R. (2008). The extended phenotype: the long reach of the gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Originally published in 1982).
Dawkins, R. (2009). The selfish gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Originally published in 1976).
Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness explained. NY: Back Bay Books.
Dennett, D. C. (1995). Darwin’s dangerous idea: evolution and the meanings of life. NY: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks.
Dennett, D. C. (2006). Breaking the spell: religion as a natural phenomenon. US: Viking.
